

Example 6b — Ordered probit regression with endogenous treatment and sample selection
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Description

Continuing from [ERM] [Example 6a](#), we show you how to estimate and interpret the results of a model for an ordinal outcome when the model includes an endogenous treatment and the data are subject to endogenous sample selection.

Remarks and examples

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Suppose that we collected our data at doctors' offices and thus observe health score information only from women who visited their doctor in the study time frame (`drvisit = 1`). We suspect that unobserved factors that affect whether a woman visited the doctor are related to those that affect whether she has insurance and to those that affect her health status. Thus, we have an endogenously selected sample and an endogenously chosen treatment.

For our selection model, we use the endogenous treatment indicator for insurance status and regular checkups before the study (`regcheck`), which is excluded from the outcome model. Our command is otherwise exactly the same as specified in [ERM] [Example 6a](#).

```
. eoprobit health i.exercise c.grade, entreat(insured = grade i.workschool)
> select(select = i.insured i.regcheck) vce(robust)
      (iteration log omitted)
Extended ordered probit regression                                Number of obs = 6,000
                                                                Selected = 4,693
                                                                Nonselected = 1,307
                                                                Wald chi2(4) = 367.30
                                                                Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -9806.1189
```

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| | Coefficient | Robust std. err. | z | P> z | [95% conf. interval] | |
|------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| health | | | | | | |
| exercise# insured | | | | | | |
| Yes#No | .4169984 | .0851131 | 4.90 | 0.000 | .2501798 | .583817 |
| Yes#Yes | .5399986 | .037546 | 14.38 | 0.000 | .4664098 | .6135874 |
| insured# c.grade | | | | | | |
| No | .1317866 | .0342405 | 3.85 | 0.000 | .0646765 | .1988967 |
| Yes | .1343324 | .0129342 | 10.39 | 0.000 | .1089818 | .159683 |
| select | | | | | | |
| insured | | | | | | |
| Yes | 1.01669 | .092325 | 11.01 | 0.000 | .8357364 | 1.197644 |
| regcheck | | | | | | |
| Yes | .5374105 | .0397297 | 13.53 | 0.000 | .4595417 | .6152793 |
| _cons | -.1690644 | .0743716 | -2.27 | 0.023 | -.3148301 | -.0232987 |
| insured | | | | | | |
| grade | .3057852 | .0100116 | 30.54 | 0.000 | .2861628 | .3254076 |
| workschool | | | | | | |
| Yes | .5314797 | .0452607 | 11.74 | 0.000 | .4427703 | .6201891 |
| _cons | -3.584315 | .1348183 | -26.59 | 0.000 | -3.848554 | -3.320077 |
| /health | | | | | | |
| insured# c.cut1 | | | | | | |
| No | .7262958 | .3313472 | | | .0768673 | 1.375724 |
| Yes | -.5450451 | .3181876 | | | -1.168681 | .0785912 |
| insured# c.cut2 | | | | | | |
| No | 1.719809 | .3129056 | | | 1.106526 | 2.333093 |
| Yes | .5683456 | .2464686 | | | .085276 | 1.051415 |
| insured# c.cut3 | | | | | | |
| No | 2.620793 | .3056038 | | | 2.021821 | 3.219766 |
| Yes | 1.442022 | .2227768 | | | 1.005387 | 1.878656 |
| insured# c.cut4 | | | | | | |
| No | 3.48945 | .3158536 | | | 2.870389 | 4.108512 |
| Yes | 2.391497 | .2090187 | | | 1.981828 | 2.801166 |
| corr(e.sel~t, e.health) | | | | | | |
| | .496699 | .0990366 | 5.02 | 0.000 | .2795869 | .665485 |
| corr(e.ins~d, e.health) | | | | | | |
| | .4032487 | .121518 | 3.32 | 0.001 | .1421331 | .6118937 |
| corr(e.ins~d, e.select) | | | | | | |
| | .2661948 | .0555596 | 4.79 | 0.000 | .1543216 | .3713287 |

At both levels of the treatment, exercise and education still have positive effects on health status.

The correlation between the errors from the selection equation and the errors from the main equation is 0.497. This is significantly different from zero, so we confirm our suspicion of endogeneity. Because it is positive, we conclude that unobservable factors that increase the chance of being in the study also tend to increase the chance of being in a higher health status category.

What are the expected average probabilities of being in each health status if every woman had insurance? If every woman did not have insurance? We can answer those questions using `estat teffects`.

```
. estat teffects, pomean
Predictive margins                                Number of obs = 6,000
POmean_Pr1: Pr(health=1=Poor)
POmean_Pr2: Pr(health=2=Not good)
POmean_Pr3: Pr(health=3=Fair)
POmean_Pr4: Pr(health=4=Good)
POmean_Pr5: Pr(health=5=Excellent)
```

| | Unconditional | | z | P> z | [95% conf. interval] | |
|------------|---------------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|----------|
| | Margin | std. err. | | | | |
| POmean_Pr1 | | | | | | |
| insured | | | | | | |
| No | .1028382 | .0327177 | 3.14 | 0.002 | .0387126 | .1669637 |
| Yes | .0058955 | .0033611 | 1.75 | 0.079 | -.0006921 | .0124831 |
| POmean_Pr2 | | | | | | |
| insured | | | | | | |
| No | .2621517 | .0479497 | 5.47 | 0.000 | .1681719 | .3561314 |
| Yes | .0618234 | .0116191 | 5.32 | 0.000 | .0390504 | .0845965 |
| POmean_Pr3 | | | | | | |
| insured | | | | | | |
| No | .3216819 | .0259933 | 12.38 | 0.000 | .270736 | .3726278 |
| Yes | .1759926 | .0100741 | 17.47 | 0.000 | .1562478 | .1957374 |
| POmean_Pr4 | | | | | | |
| insured | | | | | | |
| No | .2144017 | .0402798 | 5.32 | 0.000 | .1354547 | .2933488 |
| Yes | .3237595 | .009282 | 34.88 | 0.000 | .3055672 | .3419519 |
| POmean_Pr5 | | | | | | |
| insured | | | | | | |
| No | .0989265 | .0521147 | 1.90 | 0.058 | -.0032163 | .2010694 |
| Yes | .4325289 | .0165829 | 26.08 | 0.000 | .400027 | .4650309 |

These are the estimates of the average [potential-outcome means](#) for the population. We can consider the values in this table to be either the expected proportions of all women being in a status category or the average probabilities of being in a status category. If we multiply by 100, we can talk about the expected percentage of all women being in a status category. The first pair of rows shows the probabilities of being in the first health status, poor. If all women are uninsured, the probability of having a poor health status is 0.10. If all women are insured, that probability falls to 0.01. At the other end of the spectrum, only 9.9% of women are expected to have excellent health if no women are insured. That number rises to 43.3% if all women are insured.

If we sum all the proportions labeled no, that sum is 1.0. The same is true of the proportions labeled yes. The sum of the proportions must be 1.0 because each woman can be in only one health status.

In any health status, if we subtract the potential-outcome mean when assuming all women are uninsured from the mean when assuming all women to be insured, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE). This is the ATE that being insured has on the probability of being in the health status category. Let's do that.

```
. estat teffects
Predictive margins                                Number of obs = 6,000
ATE_Pr1: Pr(health=1=Poor)
ATE_Pr2: Pr(health=2=Not good)
ATE_Pr3: Pr(health=3=Fair)
ATE_Pr4: Pr(health=4=Good)
ATE_Pr5: Pr(health=5=Excellent)
```

| | Unconditional Margin | std. err. | z | P> z | [95% conf. interval] | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| ATE_Pr1 insured (Yes vs No) | -.0969427 | .0333853 | -2.90 | 0.004 | -.1623767 | -.0315086 |
| ATE_Pr2 insured (Yes vs No) | -.2003283 | .0552089 | -3.63 | 0.000 | -.3085358 | -.0921207 |
| ATE_Pr3 insured (Yes vs No) | -.1456893 | .0322109 | -4.52 | 0.000 | -.2088216 | -.082557 |
| ATE_Pr4 insured (Yes vs No) | .1093578 | .0437353 | 2.50 | 0.012 | .0236382 | .1950774 |
| ATE_Pr5 insured (Yes vs No) | .3336024 | .0637745 | 5.23 | 0.000 | .2086066 | .4585982 |

Looking at the last line, we see that the average probability of being in excellent health in the population of women aged 25 to 30 is 0.33 greater when all women have health insurance versus when no women have health insurance.

Because we specified `vce(robust)` at estimation, all of our estimates from `estat teffects` reported standard errors for the population ATE rather than standard errors that are conditional on the sample ATE.

Also see

- [ERM] [eoprobit](#) — Extended ordered probit regression
 - [ERM] [eoprobit postestimation](#) — Postestimation tools for `eoprobit` and `xteoprobit`
 - [ERM] [estat teffects](#) — Average treatment effects for extended regression models
 - [ERM] [Intro 4](#) — Endogenous sample-selection features
 - [ERM] [Intro 5](#) — Treatment assignment features
 - [ERM] [Intro 9](#) — Conceptual introduction via worked example
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